Arbitration Law Review
Volume 9 Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation,
Volume 9

Article 8

8-1-2017

BOLSTERING THE FOUNDATION OF
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT DECLARES EQUITABLE TOLLING
NOW APPLIES TO THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
Matthew E. Selmasska
Penn State Law, mes475@psu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons, and the Other Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Matthew E. Selmasska, BOLSTERING THE FOUNDATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DECLARES EQUITABLE TOLLING NOW APPLIES TO THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, 9 Arb. L. Rev. 291 (2017).

This Student Submission - Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at Penn State Law eLibrary. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Arbitration Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact
ram6023@psu.edu.

BOLSTERING THE FOUNDATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DECLARES EQUITABLE TOLLING NOW APPLIES TO THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
By
Matthew E. Selmasska*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the Federal Arbitration Act,
(“FAA”).1 The Court further held that Move, Inc. (“Move”) did not receive a
fundamentally fair arbitration hearing because a non-attorney who falsified his
credentials chaired the arbitration panel.2 The court reasoned that none of the textual
factors set out by the Supreme Court in Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), which
are used to determine whether the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply to a statute,
weighed against applying equitable tolling to the FAA.3 The court also stated that the
structure of the FAA is compatible with equitable tolling, and that equitable tolling would
not undermine the FAA’s basic purpose.4 Furthermore, the court held that by falsifying
his credentials and lying to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the
very presence of the chairman of the three-member arbitration panel denied Move a
fundamentally fair hearing.5 As such, the court declared that Move was entitled to vacatur
of the arbitration award under § 10(a)(3) of the FAA.6 This decision is significant
because the Ninth Circuit is only the second federal circuit to answer this question in the
affirmative.7 Additionally, because multiple federal circuits have avoided answering this
question,8 this decision could represent a bold shift in momentum favoring equitable
tolling with respect to the FAA. While the decision potentially broadens the scope of
Section 12 of the FAA and its three-month challenge requirement,9 the decision
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“Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his
attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered.” 9 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.
9

nevertheless bolsters the foundation of fundamental fairness upon which the U.S. law of
arbitration rests.
II.

BACKGROUND

Move operates the Move Network of real estate websites for consumers and real
estate professionals, and maintained an investment account with Defendant Citigroup
Global Markets, Inc. (“Citigroup”).10 Regarding its investments with Citigroup, Move
entered into a Client Agreement with Citigroup, which contained an effective arbitration
clause.11 The Client Agreement stated “that ‘all claims or controversies [between the
parties arising out of this Agreement] shall be determined by arbitration before, and only
before, any self-regulatory organization or exchange of which Citigroup is a member.’”12
In September of 2008, Move alleged that Citigroup mismanaged approximately $131
million of its funds by investing in speculative auction rate securities. 13 Thus, Move
initiated arbitration proceedings against Citigroup before a three-member panel of
FINRA.14
Prior to the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, FINRA required Move
and Citigroup to sign a Uniform Submission Agreement.15 The Uniform Submission
Agreement stated that the dispute between the parties would be submitted to arbitration
“in accordance with the Constitution, By-Laws, Rules, Regulations, and/or Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes,” which is embedded in FINRA Rules
12000-12905.16 FINRA’s Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes includes
Rule 12401(c), which required Move’s claims to be arbitrated by a panel of three FINRA
arbitrators.17 In accordance with Rule 12403, FINRA furnished to both Move and
Citigroup a list of thirty proposed arbitrators, which contained employment histories for
each prospective arbitrator on the list.18 FINRA also provided both parties with a shorter
list of ten proposed arbitrators from its chairperson roster.19 It was paramount to Move
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that the chairperson selected be an experienced attorney, particularly because this dispute
involved a complex securities issue.20
Among the list of names on the FINRA chairperson roster was James H. Frank,
who, according to an accompanying disclosure report, received a law degree in 1975
from Southwestern University and was licensed to practice law in New York, California,
and Florida.21 Move indicated that Mr. Frank was its top choice to chair the threemember arbitration panel.22 Pursuant to certain rules and regulations of FINRA,
prospective arbitrators on the lists must affirm that the information on their Arbitrator
Disclosure Report is accurate and up to date.23 Pursuant to FINRA policies, all
prospective arbitrators know that the failure to disclose material information in the
Arbitrator Disclosure Report and arbitrator profile may result in their permanent
disqualification.24 The arbitration panel to decide the parties’ dispute was ultimately
comprised of Mr. Frank as chairperson, Arthur T. Berggren, who was a licensed attorney,
and Daniel R. Brush, a Certified Public Accountant and Certified Financial Planner.25
The entire arbitration of the dispute consisted of six pre-hearing conferences and twenty
hearing sessions.26 Ultimately, on December 8, 2009, the three-member panel issued a
unanimous award in favor of Citigroup and denied Move’s claims.27
Over four years after the rendition of the arbitral award, in March of 2014, Move
discovered an article in The AmLaw Litigation Daily, which detailed how Mr. Frank had
falsified his credentials with FINRA and lied about being a licensed attorney. 28 Mr.
Frank’s full name is “James Hamilton Hardy Frank,” and he successfully impersonated a
retired California attorney by the name of “James Hamilton Frank.”29 Thereafter, FINRA
confirmed that Mr. Frank falsified his information on the Arbitrator Disclosure Report,
and lied about his qualifications.30 FINRA subsequently removed him from all existing
cases and from their roster.31
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In June of 2014, Move filed a complaint and a motion for vacatur in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that vacatur of the
arbitration award was warranted under Sections 10(a)(3) and 10(a)(4) of the FAA due to
Mr. Frank’s misrepresentations.32 While Section 12 of the FAA mandates that a notice of
motion to vacate an arbitration award must be served no later than three months after an
award is rendered, given the circumstances here, Move argued that the statutory deadline
should be equitably tolled.33 Citigroup responded to the motion by filing a motion to
dismiss, and argued that equitable tolling was not available under the FAA, and even if it
were, Move failed to demonstrate that equitable tolling was justified on the merits.34 The
district court granted Citigroup’s motion and denied Move’s motion to vacate.35
Specifically, the court ruled that equitable tolling did apply to the FAA, but Move
nonetheless failed to demonstrate an adequate ground for vacatur under the FAA. 36 The
district court further summarized that:
Mr. Frank’s misbehavior did not prejudice Move’s rights to a
fundamentally fair hearing as required by § 10(a)(3) [of the FAA]; and the
panel did not exceed its powers in violation of § 10(a)(4) because Mr.
Frank’s deceit, if cognizable at all under that section, did not violate
Move’s contractual rights under its Client Agreement with Citigroup.37
Move then timely appealed the district court’s ruling.38

III.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by declaring the de novo standard of review it
uses in reviewing a district court’s refusal to vacate an award.39 The Ninth Circuit also
uses a de novo standard of review in hearing an appeal of a district court dismissing a
complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).40
32
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Id. Equitable tolling is a legal doctrine by which the statute of limitations is paused, or “tolled.” It is
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The Court then reiterated that Section 12 of the FAA requires that a motion to vacate an
arbitration award be served within three months after the award is either filed or
delivered.41 Due to the fact that Move’s motion was filed over four years after the Section
12 statutory window had closed, the first question the Ninth Circuit had to address was
whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the FAA.42

A.

The Three-Month Statutory Period to Challenge an Arbitration Award in
Section 12 of the FAA May be Equitably Tolled.

The question of whether equitable tolling applies to the FAA was one of first
impression for the Ninth Circuit.43 Unfortunately, the case law from other circuits on this
issue was conflicting and split, with most circuit courts of appeal declining to definitively
rule one way or the other with regard to whether equitable tolling is applicable to the
FAA.44 The Ninth Circuit immediately invoked the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Young v. United States, in which the Court stated, “It is hornbook law that limitations
periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling . . . unless tolling would be
inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute.”45 Accordingly, the Court explained that,
presumably, Congress drafts these statutory limitations in light of that overarching
principle.46 Furthermore, the Court stated that a “rebuttable presumption that limitations
41
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Id. The Ninth Circuit did note that the closest the court came to deciding this question came in Lafarge
Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986). In Lafarge,
the Court was presented with the question of whether a party could “revive an unsuccessful motion to
vacate an arbitration award ‘by way of a Rule 60(b) motion with a claim of newly discovered evidence.’”
Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156. The Court declined to rule in the affirmative and stated that, “the threemonth notice requirement of Section 12 . . . would be meaningless if a party to the arbitration proceeding
could bring an independent action asserting such claims outside of the statutory time period provided in
Section 12.” Id. (emphasis in original). Most importantly, equitable tolling was neither raised nor
specifically discussed in Lafarge. Id.
44

Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156. The Ninth Circuit declined to decide this issue in Garrett v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1993), where the petitioner asked the court to accept
his late petition pursuant to the doctrine of equitable tolling. Because the Ninth Circuit found that the
district court correctly dismissed the action on a jurisdictional basis, it never reached the issue. Id.
Additionally, the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Eighth Circuit have all declined to decide
whether equitable tolling applies under the FAA. See Fradella v. Petricca, 183 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1999);
Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225-26 (4th Cir. 1986); Piccolo v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 641 F.2d
598, 601 (8th Cir. 1981). The Tenth Circuit decided that equitable tolling would suspend the running of a
statute of limitations period if Congress did not provide to the contrary. Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 447 F.3d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 2007). Lastly, the Fifth Circuit explicitly held that
equitable tolling does apply to the FAA. See Cigna Ins. Co. v. Huddleston, No. 92-1252, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 40575 at *11 (5th Cir. 1993).
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Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Young, 535 U.S. at 49-50).

periods are subject to equitable tolling must be overcome by the text or purpose of the
statute.”47
Put another way, federal statutes of limitations are typically “subject to a
‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling[,]’” and the Supreme Court has
instructed lower courts to apply multiple textual factors to federal statutes in order to
determine whether equitable tolling should be precluded.48 These factors include:
whether the limitations period is established in “unusually emphatic form;” is “unusually
generous;” whether it uses “highly detailed” and “technical language;” and “whether the
statute reiterated the limitations period several times in several different ways.”49 Because
equitable tolling is an equitable remedy, a court typically will not construe any statute to
“displace courts’ traditional equitable authority absent the clearest command[,]” so
satisfaction of one or more of these factors could prevent the application of equitable
tolling.50 The Ninth Circuit was convinced that none of these Holland factors weighed in
favor of precluding the application of equitable tolling to the FAA. 51 As the Court
explained, “. . . the FAA’s instruction that notice of a motion to vacate ‘must be served’
within three months is neither ‘unusually generous’ nor ‘unusually emphatic.’”52
Furthermore, the FAA’s limitations period is neither detailed nor technical and is not
reiterated elsewhere in the statute. Accordingly, the text of the statute does not preclude
equitable tolling.53
Citigroup made an unsuccessful comparison to Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,
and argued that the instant action should be governed by that U.S. Supreme Court
decision. There, the Court explained that Section 9 of the FAA, which commands that a
court “must grant” a motion to confirm an arbitral award within one year after the award
is made, “carries no hint of flexibility.”54 This argument ultimately failed, however,
because equitable tolling was not at issue in Hall Street Associates.55 There, the issue was
whether a court possessed the discretion to set aside an award on any grounds not
enumerated in Sections 10 or 11 of the FAA.56
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Next, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the structure of the FAA would not be
upset by the doctrine of equitable tolling.57 Citigroup again argued unsuccessfully that
because of Section 9’s “one year” provision, allowing a court to vacate an award beyond
one year would upset the entire statutory scheme of the FAA.58 The Ninth Circuit was
unconvinced, and instead stated that, “a moving party would still need to meet the heavy
burden of establishing its entitlement to equitable tolling for a court to vacate an award,
and it would only be the rare case in which the three-month deadline for a motion to
vacate would not apply.”59
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit explained that equitable tolling would not undermine the
basic purpose of the FAA.60 The Court reiterated that while the FAA supports the
“emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration”61 and provides for very limited review, that
pro-arbitration policy rests upon the assumption of a fair forum.62 The Court explicitly
stated that there “cannot [be] special deference to arbitration outcomes in the face of a
colorable claim that the forum was unfair in a particular case.”63 Therefore, in balancing
both the finality of arbitration awards and concerns for due process, the Court insisted
that arbitration would not be harmed if parties are permitted to reach the “high bar of
equitable tolling in limited circumstances.”64 Thus, holding that equitable tolling applies
to the FAA, the Ninth Circuit then had to decide the merits of Move’s motion for vacatur
to see whether significant grounds existed per Section 10(a)(3).65

B.

Move, Inc. Entitled to Vacatur Under §10(a)(3) of the FAA

The Ninth Circuit declared that Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA enables courts to
“vacate an arbitration award upon finding that ‘the arbitrators were guilty of . . . any . . .
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.”66
The
Court
simply could not accept the district court’s conclusion that Move’s rights were not
prejudiced by the arbitrator’s fraudulent misrepresentations. The question asked in
57
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determining whether an arbitrator’s misbehavior adversely impacted the rights of the
arbitrating parties was whether those parties received a fundamentally fair hearing. 67 The
Court stated that vacatur of an arbitral award could be proper where an arbitrator received
ex parte evidence that influenced the result of the arbitration proceedings, or “where an
arbitrator’s post-hearing consultation with an outside expert ‘tainted’ the panel’s
decision.”68 While the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that there had never been a similar
factual situation to the instant case, where an arbitrator’s selection was based upon his
lies and deceit, the Court concluded that such behavior is sufficient for vacatur under
Section 10(a)(3) and that Move was denied a fundamentally fair hearing.69
The Court articulated how important it was for Move to receive an actual attorney
to chair the arbitration panel, given that the claim involved a complex securities issue.70
In fact, Move had disqualified many potential attorneys from the proposed FINRA list
because it wanted a highly experienced chairperson.71 Relying on Mr. Frank’s falsified
background information, Move ranked him first on the FINRA candidate list.72 Citigroup
argued that Mr. Frank’s inclusion on the arbitration panel did not necessarily mean that
Move’s rights were prejudiced.73 Citigroup further argued that there was no evidence that
Mr. Frank’s participation affected the ultimate outcome of the arbitral proceedings.74
However, the Ninth Circuit declared that there was simply no way to know whether
prejudice had occurred.75 The Court stated, “Particularly on a small board, . . . it is
difficult if not impossible to measure the impact that one member’s views have on the
process of collective deliberation. Each member contributes not only his vote but his
voice to the deliberative process.”76
The Court then revealed that under FINRA’s own policies, the deceit that Mr.
Frank perpetuated would have resulted in his permanent disqualification from serving as
a FINRA arbitrator, and that he was indeed banished from the FINRA roster upon the

67

Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1158; U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat. Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1177 (9th Cir.
2010).
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Id. (citing Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 747 (9th Cir. 1995)).

revelation of his fraudulent misrepresentations.77 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Move’s rights were prejudiced by Mr. Frank’s participation, because Move was denied a
fundamentally fair hearing.78 As such, the Court reiterated that Move was entitled to
vacatur of the arbitration award under Section 10(a)(3).79 The Court then reversed the
district court’s judgment in part and remanded the action to the district court for entry of
judgment in favor of Move.80
On January 5, 2017, Citigroup petitioned the Ninth Circuit and sought a rehearing
on the vacatur of its arbitration award.81 Citigroup argued that its “award should be
reinstated because the panel’s allowance of equitable tolling to challenge awards beyond
the three-month statutory window could open the floodgates for broad attacks against all
arbitration awards . . . .”82 The Ninth Circuit panel was not convinced, however, and
upheld its earlier decision vacating the award.83

IV. SIGNIFICANCE
The Ninth Circuit’s holding represents an important change in the nature of
challenging arbitration awards.84 Its decision in this action is the most definitive ruling on
this issue from any federal circuit.85 As the Court discussed in the opinion, other federal
circuit court rulings on this particular issue have been unharmonious and inconsistent.86
Three federal circuits—the First, Fourth, and Eighth—have all explicitly declined to
answer whether equitable tolling could be applied to the FAA.87 Before the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court

77
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Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156 (holding that FAA Section 12’s three-month challenge requirement is not
absolute, in light of the application of equitable tolling).
84

85

Id. (acknowledging the conflicting case law from other federal circuits on this issue).

86

Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156.

87

Id. (citing Fradella v. Petricca, 183 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1991); Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225-26
(4th Cir. 1986); Piccolo v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 641 F.2d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1991)).

of Appeals was the only federal circuit to answer the question in the affirmative.88 With
two federal circuits now expressly answering this question in the affirmative, it appears
that momentum may move nationally for federal courts to hold that the FAA is subject to
equitable tolling, particularly in circumstances in which parties’ rights are prejudiced and
are thus confronted with a lack of fundamental fairness. This momentum is also likely to
move in favor of equitable tolling because no federal circuit has expressly refused to
apply equitable tolling to the FAA, but rather just opted to decline to answer the question.
More importantly, the decisions of those circuits to decline to answer the question of
whether to equitably toll the statute of limitations in the FAA were rendered more than
twenty-five years ago. Therefore, should the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits be
presented with the specific question again, the national momentum would indeed compel
a holding in the affirmative, depending on the factual scenario of a prospective case.
This decision also shows practitioners how federal circuit courts will approach the
general question of applying equitable tolling to federal statutes.89 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Young v. United States emerges as the clear starting point in analyzing how
equitable tolling may apply to federal statutory limitation periods.90 As a general rule, the
Supreme Court stated:
This Court has permitted equitable tolling in situations ‘where the
claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective
pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing
deadline to pass.’ We have acknowledged, however, that tolling might be
appropriate in other cases . . . and this, we believe, is one.91
The Supreme Court made clear in Young that there is no limit to certain factual
scenarios where equitable tolling could apply, so long as a party has been “induced or
tricked by his adversary’s misconduct . . . .”92 Here though, it is important to note that
Move’s relief did not ultimately spawn from its adversary’s misconduct, but from the
misconduct of the arbitral chairperson himself.93 Therefore, practitioners should be on
notice, especially those in the Ninth Circuit, that the liberal application of equitable
tolling could be triggered with the presence of any substantial misconduct or fraud,
irrespective of the origin of such misconduct.
At the heart of the case was the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the misconduct
by the imposter arbitrator prevented Move from participating in fundamentally fair

88
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proceedings.94 This decision makes clear that if fundamental fairness is implicated to the
point where a party’s rights are prejudiced, courts will be encouraged to apply equitable
tolling. Indeed, Move did nothing wrong, and were it not for the fortuitous disclosure of
Mr. Frank’s fraud in a legal publication four years after the rendition of the award, Move
may have never been apprised of the totality of the fraud. Thus, the Ninth Circuit heeded
the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance to allow for equitable tolling in extraordinary
circumstances. Judge Nelson wrote, “time bars in suits between private parties are
presumptively subject to equitable tolling. That means a court usually may pause the
running of a limitations statute in private litigation when a party ‘has pursued his rights
diligently but some extraordinary circumstance’ prevents him from meeting a
deadline.”95

V. COMMENTARY
Even though this decision from the Ninth Circuit resulted in the broadening of the
potential scope of Section 12 of the FAA—by allowing the statutory limitations to be
equitably tolled—and ultimately led to the vacatur of the arbitral award, the decision
nevertheless continues to support the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration. 96 It
does so by bolstering the assumption of fundamental fairness, upon which that emphatic
federal policy must rest.97 Indeed, if the foundation for the policy favoring arbitration did
not rest upon a foundation that was just, equitable, and fundamentally fair, it would be
akin to the foolish man building his house on the sand. It has long been recognized that “a
foolish man . . . built his house on sand. The rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds
blew and beat against that house, and it fell—and great was its fall!”98 The emphatic
federal policy would not command respect nor due regard from either practitioners or
courts were it not grounded in a foundation of fundamental fairness. If this policy
favoring arbitration is to be sustained, it is paramount that its foundation remains
uncompromised. Thus, principles of equity commanded the Ninth Circuit here to not only
recognize the applicability of equitable tolling to Section 12 of the FAA, but also to
acknowledge that the arbitrating party’s rights were unfairly prejudiced at the hands of
the arbitrator-imposter. The Court’s bold decision here is proper, as it is an effort to guard
and maintain the fundamentally fair foundation upon which the emphatic federal
arbitration policy rests. Hence, the Ninth Circuit also showed that it was not afraid to use
equitable measures to remedy the prejudiced rights of arbitrating parties.
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Matthew 7:26-27.

The Ninth Circuit appropriately explained why Citigroup’s comparison of the
instant case to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates was inapposite.
Hall Street Associates cannot be used as a blunt instrument against disputes challenging
the enforceability of arbitration awards. Rather, the Ninth Circuit reminds litigants that
Hall Street Associates stands for the proposition that only the enumerated instances of
vacatur in Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA are available to challenge the viability and
enforceability of arbitration awards.99 The Court in Hall Street Associates was clear:
Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three
provisions, §§ 9-11, as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration
with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential
virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading opens the
door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal
arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming
judicial review process, and bring arbitration theory to grief in [the]
postarbitration process.100
The Ninth’s Circuit’s decision in the instant case properly tracks the Supreme
Court’s rationale for only providing review and possible vacatur of awards for the
enumerated list of reasons set out in Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA. Not surprisingly, the
egregious conduct of the parties’ chief arbitrator certainly was enough to rise to the level
of fraud, corruption, and misconduct set out in Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA.101 This is
good news. If the Court found that Move’s rights were not prejudiced by an arbitrator
falsifying his credentials and lying about his identity, it is difficult to imagine what sort of
greater egregious conduct would be necessary to trigger the protections of Section
10(a)(3). While this was certainly a unique case, it provides practitioners with yet another
example of instances likely to result in vacatur of an arbitral award.

VI. CONCLUSION
Move, Inc. was denied a fundamentally fair arbitration hearing because an
imposter chaired the hearing.102 Unfortunately, the fraud did not surface until over four
years after the rendering of the award, and Move was almost left with no relief to
challenge the award.103 In light of the extraordinary circumstances of this case, the Ninth
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Circuit rectified the fraud by the imposition of equitable tolling. 104 The decision by the
Ninth Circuit demonstrates the lengths federal courts of appeal are willing to go to in
order to ensure that the arbitration process remains fundamentally fair, and that the rights
of arbitrating parties are protected. The decision to apply equitable tolling to the FAA is
precedential in the Ninth Circuit, and will likely lead to other federal circuits following
suit if given a justified opportunity. Here, the application of equitable tolling serves to
polish the veneer of the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and
enforcement. It also ensures that the rights of arbitrating parties will not be hampered or
trampled upon by an unchecked desire for confirmation at all costs.
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